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Summary. The prevailing insolvency dispute resolution mechanism is adjudication, 
which has significant shortcomings: the irresolvable common pool problem, disruption of 
business, and high litigation costs. The question is therefore whether insolvency disputes 
can be settled without (some extent of) adjudication. Namely, through alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR), which has become a counterweight to adjudication in insolvency dispu-
tes. In contrast to adjudication, ADR makes it possible to avoid the intrinsic shortcomings 
of adjudication. Firstly, it aims to reach a peaceful settlement resulting in an agreement 
between the debtor and the creditors; secondly, it aims to reconcile the principle inte-
rests in insolvency cases (continuation of the debtor’s business and satisfying the creditors’ 
claims); and thirdly, the dispute is not resolved in public. The major pro-debtor countries 
(the United States of America, France) have introduced ADR mechanisms for insolvency 
disputes which will serve as the foundation for the development of ADR in insolvency 
disputes in other countries.
Keywords: insolvency, insolvency disputes, alternative dispute resolution, adjudi-
cation, peaceful settlement, restructuring.
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Insolvency Disputes 245
1. Introduction
Insolvency1 disputes are about money. When a debtor is faced with financial prob-
lems, creditors want to be paid what they are owed. An insolvency case is commenced and 
creditors compete for the limited pool of assets (estate), which is almost never enough to 
pay everyone (the common pool problem). Consequently, the debtor is liquidated, which 
means the end of the business, jobs and tax payments. In terms of negotiation, it is a lose-
lose situation.
The resolution of insolvency disputes has long been limited to the courts. This is 
because adjudication ensures equality of the creditors’ claims (pari passu), fair col-
lection and distribution of the debtor’s assets, and prompt liquidation of the insolvent 
entity. However, this perception has changed over the past few decades, when more 
insolvency disputes have been resolved not only by adjudication, but also by ADR. 
Generally, the legislator chooses either a pro-debtor or a pro-creditor insolvency re-
gime.2 ADR encourages the parties of the dispute to reach an agreement by negotiation 
and avoid adjudication.
The objective of this research is to analyze which ADR models are used for insol-
vency disputes and how compatible they are with the main principles of insolvency law. 
Although ADR (in various forms) has been accepted in insolvency disputes, questions 
arise over the extent to which the parties are free to agree on the conditions of debt pay-
ments, as well as what the requirements are for such agreements. How can ADR ensure 
a fair balance between the parties in such disputes?
The objectives are:
1. To analyze the emergence and development of ADR in insolvency disputes, as 
well as the main differences between adjudication and ADR.
2. To examine the ADR mechanism for insolvency disputes in France and the 
United States.
3. To analyze the reconciliation of collective and individual interests in insol-
vency disputes as well as application of the main principles of contract law in 
ADR for insolvency disputes.
2. The Development of ADR in Insolvency Disputes
In response to the increase in civil disputes and the socioeconomic changes tak-
ing place, mediation began to be used to resolve community and family disputes in the 
1 In this article, the term “insolvency” covers all situations when a debtor is unable to repay debts as 
they mature (“cash-flow insolvency”), and/or when liabilities exceed the value of assets (“balance-
sheet insolvency”). It shall also cover situations where the purpose of dispute resolution is the rescue 
or reorganization of the debtor and/or debt adjustment. The term “insolvency dispute” shall refer to 
all disputes between a debtor and creditors related to repayment of a debt where insolvency law is 
applicable.
2 Lechne, R. 2002. Waking from the Jurisdictional Nightmare of Multinational Default: the European 
Council Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, Arizona Journal of International and Comparative 
Law. 19(3): 975-1024, 977. 
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United States in the 1960s.3 Though it gained early success, it took a while for it to be 
used in insolvency disputes. The watershed moment was the Pound Conference, where 
Harvard Professor Frank Sander introduced the “multi-door courthouse” and encour-
aged looking for different dispute resolution methods. Instead of walking through the 
door of a courthouse and commencing adjudication, the parties should look for “alter-
native doors” which would lead to the same result (resolution of the dispute). He empha-
sized that there is “a rich variety of different processes, which, I would submit, singly or 
in combination, may provide far more ‘effective’ conflict resolution.” 4 This quote cap-
tures the three basic pillars of ADR. Firstly, different “doors” (procedures) offer differ-
ent dispute resolution mechanisms. Secondly, those mechanisms can be used “singly or 
in combination”, meaning that different ADR methods may be used for resolution of the 
same dispute (and ADR can intertwine with adjudication). Thirdly, it must be effective. 
ADR (mediation) was introduced for insolvency cases in 1986, when the 
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of California established the mediation 
program.5 A few years later, mediation was used in the United States when Greyhound 
Lines Inc. went bankrupt and set up a pre-reorganization mediation plan for thousands 
of claimants who had brought personal injury and property damage claims against the 
company in connection with traffic accidents involving Greyhound vehicles.6 This case 
is a good example of multi-party dispute resolution in which the debtor dealt individu-
ally with each creditor.
The ADR procedure in the Greyhound dispute consisted of three separate stages. 
First, the creditor had to complete a claim form for lost wages, medical bills and other 
damages (the “offer and exchange stage”). Second, the parties negotiated damages. If the 
creditor refused to participate in this stage or a final decision was not reached, the par-
ties engaged in mediation for 60 days. Third, if the parties failed to reach an agreement, 
they had to recourse to arbitration. Half of the claims were resolved in the first stage.7 
This is an example of a win-win negotiation which made it possible to resolve the case 
promptly, avoid adjudication and litigation costs, reconcile the interests of the parties, 
and end the dispute peacefully. 
In light of the successful examples of ADR, the growing number of bankrupt-
cy cases, and increasing litigation costs, a legal regulation for ADR was established. 
A major legislative leap towards the use of ADR in insolvency cases was the adoption 
of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act in 1998, which required that each federal 
district court authorize ADR in “all civil actions, including adversary proceedings in 
bankruptcy.”8 For instance, in 2004 the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware 
3 Welsh N. A. 2010. You’ve Got Your Mother’s Laugh: What Bankruptcy Mediation Can Learn from the 
Her/History of Divorce and Child Custody Mediation, Penn State Law Legal Studies Research Paper. 
7: 427-461, 431. 
4 McAdoo, B., Welsh. N. A., 2005. Look Before You Leap and Keep on Looking: Lessons from the 
Institutionalization of Court-Connected Mediation, Nevada Law Journal. 5: 399-431, 402.
5 Supra note 3, 441.
6 Ibid.
7 Desgrosseilliers. M. L., Shelter, G. 2009. The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution Procedures to 
Resolve Tort Claims in Bankruptcy Norton Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Practice. 18(1):19-64, 32. 
8 Section 654 of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998 (28 U.S.C.A).
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established that before certain adversary proceedings, the parties had to attempt to 
reach an agreement by mediation. As a result, ADR was used in 60 percent of reorgani-
zation cases in the United States from 2000 to 2011.9
The European Commission acknowledged the need for a new insolvency dispute 
resolution mechanism in the Proposal for a Directive on Insolvency, Restructuring and 
Second Chance, which will be the basis for the forthcoming Directive on Harmonization 
of Insolvency Regulation throughout the EU Member States.10 This piece of legislation 
will encourage Member States to look for new ways to rescue businesses and avoid in-
solvency adjudication. Furthermore, compared with the previous regulation, the new 
European Insolvency Regulation11 has broadened the scope of regulation and is applica-
ble to pre-insolvency dispute resolution.12
ADR has gradually become accepted among the EU Member States. This is in con-
trast to ADR in the United States, where it emerged not from case law, but through legisla-
tion. A number of EU Member States have introduced pre-insolvency dispute resolution 
methods which are primarily aimed at rescuing the debtor.13 For example, French insol-
vency law provides for two special procedures: the ad hoc mandate (mandat ad hoc) and 
conciliation.14 In Germany, the insolvency plan procedure (Insolvenzplanverfahren)15 
enables the debtor and the creditors to conclude an insolvency plan (Insolvenzplan) by 
negotiation.
The growing use of ADR in insolvency disputes has been coupled with the need to 
reduce the number of insolvency cases and ensure stability in the market (the business 
rescue culture). Insolvency law is one of the key elements for a well-functioning system 
of civil and corporate law, and it has significant impact on the entire economic struc-
ture.16 In a socioeconomic sense, preventing a company from going bankrupt (winding 
up) when it is facing financial difficulties provides the opportunity to continue employ-
ment, efficiently utilize all available sources (natural resources, technical equipment) 
9 International Insolvency Institute, International ADR 2.0: Big Solutions for Big Problems 
[interactive]; [accessed 9 November 2017]. https://www.iiiglobal.org/sites/default/files/
transnationalalternativesgrowingrolesofalternativedisputeresolutionintransnationalinsolvencycases.pdf.
10 European Commission Proposal for a Directive on Insolvency, Restructuring and Second Chance 
Measures to Increase the Efficiency of Restructuring, Insolvency and Discharge Procedures and 
Amending Directive 2012/30/EU [interactive] 2016 COM [accessed 8 November 2017]. <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52016PC0723>.
11 Regulation (EU) 2015/848 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2015 on 
insolvency proceedings, OJ L 141.
12 Ibid, Art. 1(1): This Regulation shall apply to public collective proceedings, including interim proceedings, 
which are based on laws relating to insolvency and in which, for the purpose of rescue, adjustment of 
debt, reorganisation or liquidation.
13 European Law Institute, Rescue of Business in Insolvency Law, [interactive] 2017 [accessed 14 
October 2017]. <http://www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/p_eli/Publications/
Instrument_INSOLVENCY.pdf>.
14 Art. L611-1 L611-16 of the Code de commerce. [interactive] [accessed 14 November 2017]. <https://
www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCode.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000005634379>.
15 Art. 217-234 of Insolvenzordnung. [interactive] [accessed 14 September 2017]. < https://www.
gesetze-im-internet.de/inso/>.
16 Wessels, B., Makell, B. A., Kilborn, J. J. 2009. International Cooperation in Bankruptcy and Insolvency 
Matters. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2.
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and preserve relationships, such as with small suppliers of goods and buyers/customers 
of products and services.17 
In general, ADR has witnessed a major shift in insolvency disputes over the past 
few decades. It has become a counterweight to adjudication and has gained recognition 
as a suitable mechanism for addressing the difficulties of insolvency disputes by allow-
ing the parties to negotiate debt repayment instead of filing a lawsuit.
3. The Main Advantages of ADR in Insolvency Cases
ADR differs from adjudication. ADR is basically any process designed to resolve 
a legal dispute by compromise with third-party assistance and without (significant) in-
volvement of the judiciary.18 Various forms of ADR exist, but the participation of a third 
party (a conciliator, mediator or negotiator) is usually indispensable. The success of 
ADR (resolution of the dispute) depends primarily on the negotiation skills and good 
faith of the parties. This is in contrast to adjudication, where the court conducts pro-
ceedings and the litigants must comply with strict procedural laws which may hamper 
creativity and the effectiveness of dispute resolution.
Firstly, ADR increases the likelihood of a win-win scenario and decreases the likelihood 
of a lose-lose situation. With ADR, both parties satisfy their principal claims by mitigating 
their demands to some extent (at least in the short term). ADR is based on negotiations be-
tween the parties, supervised by a third party. Negotiations make it possible to “separate the 
people from the problem”19 and come to a mutual decision on the problem without (almost) 
any of the constraints established by law. Adjudication, alas, is based upon a “winner/loser” 
paradigm,20 meaning that one of the parties ends up losing the case. This can sever com-
mercial relations and trustworthiness between business partners. Sometimes, adjudication 
results not only in the financial, but also the psychological depletion of the parties.21
Secondly, ultimate resolution of the dispute is not the main goal in some cases. ADR 
is often not binding upon the parties because neither the mediator nor the parties are au-
thorized to resolve the dispute.22 Some scholars feel that ADR promotes settlement of the 
dispute23 rather than reaching an ultimate resolution (similar to a res judicata decision in 
court). In other words, ADR allows the parties to assess their positions and consider the 
final resolution of the dispute in the future: “Even if mediation fails to bring a settlement 
immediately, the shift in the parties’ attitudes regarding their own positions can lead to a 
17 Ibid.
18 Woodward, W. J. Jr. 1999. Evaluating Bankruptcy Mediation, Journal of Dispute Resolution. 1999(1):1-
28, 6.
19 Kelly, E. J., Kaminskienė, N. 2016. Importance of emotional intelligence in negotiation and mediation, 
International Comparative Jurisprudence. 2:55-60, 55.
20 Tennille, B. F., Applebaum L., Nees, A. T. 2010. Getting to Yes in Specialized Courts: The Unique Role 
of ADR in Business Court Cases, Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal. 11(35): 1-90, 66.
21 Supra note 3, 439.
22 Esher, J. A. 2009. Alternative Dispute Resolution in U.S. Bankruptcy Practice, University of 
Massachusetts Law Review. 4: 76-89, 79: “the mediator is not authorized to render a decision concerning 
the outcome of the dispute.”
23 Supra note 20, 59.
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settlement in the future.”24 ADR encourages the parties to bargain and find a mutual solu-
tion.25 In adjudication, a final and binding decision must be rendered in each case. When 
an insolvency (bankruptcy) case is commenced, it usually results in the winding up of the 
debtor and triggers the irresolvable common pool problem.
Thirdly, ADR preserves a “normal” relationship between the parties.26 It is usually 
a private procedure rather than a public one, allowing the parties to avoid publicity of 
the dispute. This is particularly valuable incentive in business relations (securing com-
mercial secrets and other relevant information). In contrast, all disputes that require 
adjudication become public (except in select cases), and the court, as a general rule, has 
to allow public access to proceedings.
Fourthly, ADR is flexible27—it allows the parties to reach an agreement through 
persuasion, and promotes “party-driven solutions.”28 The parties can decide upon the 
procedural and substantive rules of dispute resolution. In adjudication (especially with 
insolvency cases), the parties are bound by strict procedural rules from which no dero-
gation is permissible. The rules for civil (insolvency) proceedings may decrease the ef-
fectiveness of fast dispute settlement.29
Overall, ADR makes it possible to avoid some of the inherent shortcomings of 
adjudication (e.g., cost, publicity, lack of flexibility) in insolvency disputes. This is valu-
able because the debtor’s assets are not wasted on litigation, trustee salaries and other 
costs. The commencement of an insolvency case reveals the debtor’s problematic finan-
cial situation and hinders business. ADR provides strong incentives for both parties to 
engage in fast and efficient dispute resolution and look for a common business solution.
4. The Application of ADR in Insolvency Disputes
ADR is an alluring way to resolve business disputes. Yet to what extent can it be 
used for insolvency cases? Insolvency disputes distinguish by public interest, involve-
ment of numerous persons, ranking of claims, and strict rules for distribution of the 
debtor’s assets. Is ADR a suitable way to reconcile these differences?
A recent comparative study reveals that there are three ways for resolving insol-
vency disputes:
• workouts (an agreement between the debtor and the creditors on a solution for 
the debtor’s financial problems);
• pre-insolvency proceedings (rescuing the debtor’s business with minimal in-
volvement of the judiciary or none at all);
• formal (restructuring and insolvency) proceedings.30
24 Davis, A. 2009. Moving from Mandatory: Making ADR Voluntary in New York Commercial Division 
Cases, Cardozo Journal of Conflict Resolution. 8: 283-304, 293. 
25 Supra note 3, 436.
26 Supra note 20, 59.
27 Blake, S., Browne, J., Sime, S. (2016), A Practical Approach to Alternative Dispute Resolution. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 6.
28 Supra note 20, 3.
29 Supra note 27, 6.
30 Supra note 13.
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All three methods aim to resolve insolvency (or probable insolvency), but their 
means and goals differ considerably. Even though ADR may play an important role in 
each of these mechanisms, the most significant application of ADR is in pre-insolvency 
proceedings, which makes it possible to avoid adjudication. Some key features of these 
mechanisms are highlighted in this article.
Workouts
In workouts, the debtor is still solvent and negotiates with creditors on the repay-
ment of debt(s). The debtor’s insolvency is probable, but not imminent.31 The creditors 
are therefore not in danger of losing payment of the debt. A stay of enforcement against 
the debtor is not applicable because the settlement does not usually involve all of the 
creditors, and the debtor is continuing business activities.
Workout agreements involve different means to resolve the dispute, for instance: 
re-financing, changes to the debt contract, a property/property swap, a property/equity 
swap, or an equity/equity swap. In other words, the debtor renegotiates the debt re-
payment with creditors. Workouts are primarily governed by contract law (freedom of 
contract), and insolvency laws are not applicable (except for some procedural aspects).
Involvement of the judiciary in workouts is uncommon,32 and the parties have to 
bargain over the repayment of debt. Which concrete forms of ADR are used depends 
on the parties (or the legislator). For instance, mediation and judicial settlement con-
ferences are applicable since the dispute does not require thorough financial analysis. 
A good example of a workout is the ad hoc mandate (mandat ad hoc) in the French 
insolvency system. In general, contract law is applicable in workouts, which means that 
the parties are free to agree on the terms of debt repayment.
Pre-Insolvency Proceedings
Pre-insolvency proceedings are judicial proceedings.33 Although the goal is to res-
cue the business, pre-insolvency proceedings relate more to the application of insol-
vency than to contract law. This procedure is divided into two forms:
• Workout supporting proceedings. This procedure includes few tools for bar-
gaining over debt and does not affect all creditors (shareholders). Only some 
creditors are involved. Insolvency threshold test is not applicable;
• Restructuring proceedings. This procedure includes numerous dispute resolu-
tion methods and all of the creditors are involved. An insolvency threshold 
test is applicable (an insolvent debtor does not usually have the right to com-
mence this procedure).
The essential difference between these two forms lays in the effect on the debtor’s busi-
ness and the creditor’s claims. In workout supporting proceedings, a stay (moratorium) of 
claims against the debtor is not applicable, since this procedure only concerns certain credi-
31 Ibid.
32 In some jurisdictions, courts participate in workouts. For example, in Belgium, Greece and Spain, the 
court may participate in this procedure in order to ensure the lawfulness of the agreement reached.
33 Ibid.
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tors. Accordingly, the agreement only binds the creditors involved in the proceedings. In 
restructuring proceedings, it is the opposite. Another difference is the scope of involvement 
of the judiciary. In workout supporting proceedings, the court plays a minor role (it usu-
ally opens the proceedings, appoints the mediator, and confirms the lawfulness of the debt 
agreement), and resolution of the dispute primarily depends on the negotiation skills of the 
parties. In the second case, the court plays a more active role in the resolution of the dispute.
Generally, the debtor must be solvent before commencement of this procedure, but 
this condition depends on national legislation. In France, for instance, the conciliation 
procedure is applicable even if the debtor is cash-flow insolvent for up to 45 days. A stay 
of enforcement against a debtor may be established.
Formal Proceedings
The goal of formal insolvency proceedings is to manage the debtor’s insolvency 
problems.34 In contrast to workouts and pre-insolvency proceedings, the objective here 
is not to rescue the debtor. In this case, insolvency law plays the principal role, and 
negotiations between the debtor and the creditors are restricted by mandatory rules.
ADR can play an important role in any phase of insolvency disputes. Nevertheless, 
the author believes that ADR is most important in the first two models because it may 
make it possible to avoid the commencement of insolvency adjudication and winding 
up of the insolvent entity.
The use of ADR in insolvency disputes has become common in the United States 
and France. Both countries have established pro-debtor insolvency regimes which aim 
to ensure continuity of the debtor’s business. Some key models for ADR in insolvency 
cases are analyzed in this article.
ADR Models for Insolvency Disputes in the United States
The United States is the cradle of ADR in bankruptcy (insolvency) cases.35 
The current model for ADR in insolvency disputes derives from labor, commercial, civil 
rights, environmental and family law.36 In the 1970s and 1980s, new methods for the 
resolution of business disputes emerged, such as “multi-party negotiation, mediation, 
arbitration and hybrid processes like community consensus building.”37 
The aim of bankruptcy law in the United States is to ensure that the creditors 
are treated fairly, and that the debtor is given a fresh start (“companies can reinvent 
themselves”).38 This pro-debtor approach means that the main goal of the bankruptcy 
regime is to recover business. Mediation is usually commenced when the court issues an 
order referring the parties to mediation.39
34 Supra note 13.
35 In the US legal system, the term “bankruptcy” includes the notion of “insolvency”. Thus, bankruptcy 
shall be synonymous with insolvency in this article.
36 Steffek, F.; Unberath, H. ed. 2013. Regulating Dispute Resolution: ADR and Access to Justice 
at the Crossroads. Oxford Hart Publishing, 430.
37 Ibid, 431.
38  Vance, D. 2009. Corporate Restructuring. Springer, 243.
39 Atlas, F. N.; Huber, S. K. ed. 2000. Alternative Dispute Resolution: The Litigator’s Handbook. American 
Bar Association.
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Almost half of the bankruptcy courts now have local rules or general orders re-
quiring mediation in specified matters.40 It is at the discretion of the bankruptcy courts 
to establish local rules for court-annexed ADR procedures. For instance, Local Rule 
9019-5a (Mediation) of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware 
establishes that “the Court may assign to mediation any dispute arising in an adversary 
proceeding, contested matter or otherwise in a bankruptcy case.”41
In the United States, the bankruptcy procedure is governed primarily by the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Bankruptcy Code). The current version of the 
Bankruptcy Code is codified as Title 11 of the United States Code. Chapter 7 of this code 
regulates liquidation (winding up of a failing company), and Chapter 11 regulates re-
organization, namely—allowing negotiations between a debtor and a creditor(s) which 
lead to the conclusion of a reorganization plan.42 
The Bankruptcy Code does not establish ADR, but pursuant to Section 3(b) of the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998, district courts are authorized to use ADR 
in all civil actions, including adversary proceedings in bankruptcy.43 This law explicitly 
requires that each district court provide “at least one alternative dispute resolution pro-
cess, including, but not limited to, mediation, early neutral evaluation, mini-trial, and 
arbitration.”44 
The reorganization procedure provided for in Chapter 11  can be commenced vol-
untarily (when the debtor files a petition with the court)45 or involuntarily (when three 
or more creditors whose claims aggregate to more than $5,000 or one creditor with a 
claim of $5,000 or more, if there are less than twelve creditors file a petition).46 In the 
latter case, the creditors must show that either the debtor is not paying undisputed debts 
as they become due, or a guardian or trustee was appointed to take charge of substan-
tially all of the debtors’ property within 120 days prior to filing the petition.47 If the 
debtor submits the petition, an automatic stay of all collection actions goes into effect.48 
However, only one percent of bankruptcy cases are filed by creditors.49 Mediation is 
the most common form of ADR in bankruptcy cases in the United States and is used 
40 Supra note 9.
41 Rule 9019-5a Mediation of District court of Delaware. [interactive] [accessed 10 December 2017]. 
<http://www.deb.uscourts.gov/mediation-information>.
42 Art. 1121-1129 of Chapter 11 (11 U.S.C.). [interactive] [accessed 9 December 2017].  <https://www.
law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/11>.
43 Art. 651 (b) of 28 U.S. Code (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998) (28 U.S.C.). [interactive] 
[accessed 4 November 2017]. https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/651.
44 Art. 651 (a) of 28 U.S. Code (Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of 1998) (28 U.S.C.).
45 Supra note 42, Art. 301(a): “A voluntary case under a chapter of this title is commenced by the filing 
with the bankruptcy court of a petition under such chapter by an entity that may be a debtor under 
such chapter.”
46 Supra note 42. Art. 303(a): “An involuntary case may be commenced only under Chapter 7 or 11 
of this title, and only against a person, except a farmer, family farmer, or a corporation that is not a 
moneyed, business, or commercial corporation, that may be a debtor under the chapter under which 
such case is commenced.”
47 Art. 303(h) of U.S. Code 301.
48 Supra note 38, 246.
49 Epstein, D., Nickles, S. 2014. Principles of Bankruptcy Law 2nd ed. West Academic Publishing, 35. 
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for everything from “simple claim objections to complex, multi-party Chapter 11 plan 
negotiations.”50
ADR in Insolvency Disputes in France
For a long time, the French insolvency regime was based on the sanctioning of 
debtors who fail to pay debts to their creditor(s). Nevertheless, it was established in the 
1990s that the main purpose of insolvency law is to “preserve the interests of the compa-
ny . . . and its creditors, and only secondarily to preserve the interests of the creditors.”51 
Since 2006, the insolvency regime in France has been principally regulated by Book VI 
of the French Commercial Code (Code de commerce). 
According to the French insolvency regime, the insolvency procedure that is used 
basically depends on the financial situation of the debtor. The options are:
• Court-assisted pre-insolvency proceedings (ad hoc mandate and conciliation);
• Court-controlled pre-insolvency proceedings (preservation); 
• Insolvency (bankruptcy) proceedings (judicial rescue and judicial liquida-
tion).
In court-assisted pre-insolvency proceedings, negotiations between the debtor and 
creditors are under the supervision of an ad hoc mandate (mandat ad hoc)52 or a con-
ciliator.53 In this case, the court has limited powers (commencement and conclusion of 
proceedings, approval of the agreement over debt repayment). In the other two proce-
dures, the court plays a substantial role and ensures smooth insolvency (pre-insolvency) 
proceedings which aim to either rescue or liquidate the debtor. 
The main goal of the court-assisted pre-insolvency procedure is to reach an ami-
cable agreement between the debtor and the principal creditors.54 In contrast to pres-
ervation (sauvegard) and other insolvency proceedings, ADR is not public and does 
not trigger a stay of claims (order for enforcement) against the debtor. Both the ad hoc 
mandate and conciliation aim to negotiate the debtor’s economic, legal or financial dif-
ficulties only when the debtor is cash-flow solvent.55 The Code de commerce establishes 
that these procedures can be used when a company is facing difficulties that may jeop-
ardize continuity of its operations (difficultés de nature à compromettre la continuité de 
l’exploitation).56 Though the law does not define the notion of “difficultés”, it relates to 
the economic, financial or fiscal problems that the debtor has encountered. 
Two significant advantages of the ad hoc mandate and conciliation are confidenti-
ality and flexibility.57 Confidentiality means that all information about the negotiations 
between the debtor and the principal creditors must be kept confidential. The French 
50 Supra note 22, 78.
51 Faber, D.; Vermunt, N.; Kilborn. J., ed. 2012. Commencement of Insolvency Proceedings, C. Dupoux, 
C. Nerguararian, National report France. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
52 Supra note 14, Art. L611-3.
53 Ibid Art. L611-6.
54 Supra note 51.
55 Except insolvency up to 45 days is allowed in conciliation procedure.
56 Supra note 14, Art. L611-2.
57 Supra note 51.
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Court of Cassation (Cour de cassation) has emphasized the importance of this principle. 
In one case,58 the Court of Cassation ruled that in the ad hoc mandate and concilia-
tion, confidentiality prevails over the right to expression (public announcement of the 
debtor’s financial situation). It stated that the media does not have a right to publish 
information about conciliation or the ad hoc mandate and the debtor’s financial situa-
tion because it may harm the outcome of ADR. After analysis of Article L.611-15 of the 
Code de commerce, the court concluded that: “Because information related to concili-
ation or the ad hoc mandate is of a confidential nature, the law has restricted the free-
dom of expression for the legitimate purpose of preventing the financial difficulties of 
companies.”59 It concluded that in this case, freedom of expression under the European 
Convention of Human Rights is legitimately restricted.
Flexibility is coupled with the freedom of the parties to reach a peaceful agreement 
in the way that they desire. The Code de commerce does not establish how the parties 
shall reach an agreement and on what terms, although the peaceful settlement must 
help the debtor rescue the business.60
In both procedures, only the debtor (or management thereof) can apply to the 
court to commence pre-insolvency proceedings.61 Creditors are not entitled to do so. 
Both procedures are used for corporate entities, individuals performing commercial 
or agricultural business operations, and self-employed persons undertaking non-com-
mercial activities.62 With conciliation, the debtor’s request (requête) is submitted to a 
commercial court (tribunal de commerce), while for an ad hoc mandate, the request is 
submitted to a high court (tribunal de grande instance) or a commercial court.
The primary goal of these procedures is to prevent insolvency of the debtor. This is 
similar to that of Chapter 11 to rescue the business. However, in US bankruptcy law, ADR 
is used during the bankruptcy procedure (after its commencement). In the French legal 
system, only a debtor can initiate pre-insolvency proceedings. Both pre-insolvency proce-
dures have proven to be successful in practice. For instance, approximately 1,000 concilia-
tion procedures were opened in France in 2015, and the success rate for these proceedings 
was approximately 70 percent.63 Both pre-insolvency procedures are analyzed in this article.
The Ad Hoc Mandate (Mandat ad hoc)
The aim of the ad hoc mandate is to “negotiate a restructuring agreement between a 
debtor and the main creditors.”64 This procedure is only permitted for cash-flow solvent 
58 Cour de cassation, civile, Chambre commerciale, 15 décembre 2015, No 14-11.500. [interactive] 
[accessed 4 September 2017]. <https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichJuriJudi.do?oldAction=rechJuri
Judi&idTexte=JURITEXT000031652185&fastReqId=74732812&fastPos=1>. 
59 Ibid.: “ALORS QU'en conférant aux informations relatives aux procédures de conciliation ou à un 
mandat ad hoc un caractère secret, la loi a restreint la liberté d'expression dans le but légitime de prévenir 
les difficultés financières des entreprises.”
60 Supra note 14, Art. L611-8-II.
61 Ibid, Art. L611-2-I, Article L611-3 I.
62 Supra note 51.
63 Directorate General for Internal Policies, The Commission Insolvency Proposal and its Impact on 
Creditor’s Protection. [interactive] 2017 [accessed 14 December 2017]. <http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/583155/IPOL_STU(2017)583155_EN.pdf>. 
64 Supra note 51.
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companies.65 It is commenced by a debtor’s claim (demande d’un debiteur) being submit-
ted to the president of a commercial court,66 who then begins the procedure by an order 
which indicates the term and content (la teneur) thereof. Commencement of this proce-
dure is strictly confidential. The president of the commercial court has the right to de-
mand relevant documents about the debtor’s financial situation from public institutions.67
The ad hoc nominee (mandataire ad hoc) helps the management reach an agree-
ment that allows the debtor facing economic, legal or financial difficulties to continue 
operations.68 In this procedure, a mediator assists the debtor in reaching an agreement 
with the principal creditors. The Code de commerce does not set a time-limit for this 
procedure. Creditors who do not take part in these negotiations are not bound by the 
agreement. The accrual of interests is not suspended.69
The ad hoc mandate procedure ends in one of three ways:
• A solution is not found and ADR is discontinued;
• An agreement is reached under the ad hoc mandate;
• An agreement is not reached and the conciliation procedure is commenced.
This procedure is often used as a preliminary stage for the conciliation procedure, 
since it does not have time limit.70 However, if the debtor and the principal creditors 
reach an agreement, it ends the dispute. 
Conciliation 
Conciliation differs from the ad hoc mandate. Firstly, it is permitted for a cash-
flow insolvent debtor if the debtor is insolvent for no more than 45 days before the re-
quest is submitted to the court.71 Thus, the insolvency threshold is applicable. Secondly, 
it has a strict time limit (four months) which can be extended by one month at the 
conciliator’s request.72 
A debtor commences conciliation by submitting a request to a commercial court73 
concerning the economic, social and financial situation, financial needs, and means 
of dealing with it.74 The opening of this procedure is dependent on three cumulative 
conditions: the debtor must be engaged in commercial or artisan activities (une activité 
commerciale ou artisanale); the debtor must prove existing or foreseeable judicial, eco-
nomic or financial difficulty (une difficulté juridique, économique ou financière, avérée 
ou prévisible); and the debtor must be solvent or insolvent only if the cessation of pay-
ments has not lasted longer than 45 days (ne se trouvent pas en cessation des paiements 
depuis plus de quarante-cinq jours).
65 Ibid.
66 Supra note, Art. L611-3,
67 Ibid, Art. L611-3-I.
68 Ibid, Art. L611-2.
69 Supra note 51.
70 Supra note 51.
71 Supra note Art. L611-4, 
72 Ibid, Art. L611-6.
73 Ibid, L611-3. 
74 Ibid, Art. L611-6.
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Thus, the debtor’s financial situation must be thoroughly assessed before the com-
mencement of conciliation. This is the principal requirement that prevents bad faith insol-
vent debtors from commencing this procedure in order to avoid lawful creditors’ claims. 
The main participants in conciliation are the debtor, the chairperson of the court, 
the principal creditors, and the conciliator. The conciliator plays the principal role in 
negotiations and assists the debtor and the principal creditors (principaux créanciers) 
in reaching an amicable agreement (un accord amiable) that allows the debtor’s difficul-
ties to be solved.75 The debtor may nominate a conciliator, but the court has to appoint 
this person. This is an important opportunity for the debtor to appoint a person who 
understands the specifics of the particular market or business. The conciliator may pre-
sent a plan concerning preservation (sauvegarde) of the company and continuance of 
economic activities.76 The debtor must cooperate with the conciliator. For example, the 
conciliator has the right to demand any useful information (tout renseignement utile).77
With the exception of a few cases (when the provisions of the Code du travail or 
the Code de la sécurité sociale are applied in the dispute),78 the law does not establish 
how amicable agreements should be reached. Thus, the parties agree on the conditions 
themselves. This liberal approach shows that negotiations are an indispensable part of 
conciliation. The parties are free to decide on the procedural and substantive rules of 
the agreement. However, the subject matter of the amicable agreement is the payment 
of debts which will allow the debtor to continue business.
Conciliation ends in one of these ways:
• An amicable agreement is not reached. In this case, the court terminates con-
ciliation upon receiving the conciliator’s report; 
• An amicable agreement is reached. In this case, there are two possibilities:
i. Acknowledgment.79 The parties end the negotiations with a joint request (la 
requête conjointe) and the president of the court acknowledges (constaté) the 
agreement. The debtor has to submit a statement (declaration) that it was not 
insolvent (en cessation des paiements) when the agreement was reached or the 
agreement is terminated (mettre en fin). This agreement ends the conciliation 
procedure.
ii. Endorsement.80 This is a more formal procedure. The debtor files an appli-
cation to the court for endorsement of the agreement (homologue). The court 
endorses the agreement if three cumulative conditions are met:
1. the debtor is not cash-flow insolvent or the conciliation agreement puts 
an end to it;81
75 Ibid, Art. L611-7.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid, Art. L611-8-I.
80 Ibid, Art. L611-8-II.
81 Le débiteur n'est pas en cessation des paiements ou l'accord conclu y met fin.
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2. the agreement effectively ensures that the company will continue 
business;82
3. the agreement does not unduly (indirectly) affect the rights of non-sig-
natory creditors.83
The acknowledgment or endorsement of an amicable agreement does not mean 
that its execution remains without control. If the debtor fails to carry out the obliga-
tions, the court terminates the pre-insolvency proceedings.84
The law establishes some rules related to the execution of the agreement. 
Firstly, during execution of the agreement, any legal action against the debtor con-
cerning the movable and immovable property thereof for the purpose of obtaining pay-
ment is prohibited.85 This prohibition is to some extent similar to the stay of pecuniary 
actions against a debtor when bankruptcy proceedings are commenced in court.
Secondly, the creditors who concluded the agreement have priority over the debt-
or’s other creditors if preservation (sauvegarde), judicial rescue (redressement judiciare) 
or judicial liquidation (liquidation judiciare) proceedings are commenced. Such credi-
tors therefore have priority over other creditors. 
Thirdly, the opening of preservation, judicial rescue or judicial liquidation pro-
ceedings terminates the amicable agreement concluded under Article L611-8.86 In this 
way, the legislator protects the general interests of creditors and establishes checks and 
balances between the parties.
Thus, the aim of conciliation is to encourage the debtor and the principal credi-
tors to reach a peaceful settlement. The agreement is not publicly announced and the 
debtor’s financial situation is not revealed. 
In general, the French insolvency regime reflects the main goals of ADR. Firstly, 
the law does not establish mandatory norms on how parties are supposed to reach an 
amicable agreement. Secondly, in both ADR procedures, the court only plays a formal 
role. This is in stark contrast to formal insolvency proceedings, where the court is usu-
ally called upon to participate actively and ensure a smooth insolvency process. Thirdly, 
the French insolvency regime has established a fair balance for the protection of credi-
tors’ and public interests. Though a debtor may be insolvent for up to 45 days, ADR may 
be commenced. However, the legislator establishes restrictions which prevent a debtor 
from abusing this system. For instance, if a company is cash-flow insolvent, it is obligat-
ed to file for the commencement of judicial reorganization or judicial liquidation within 
45 days of the date the company became insolvent (unless conciliation has already been 
commenced).87 Even if ADR fails, both parties may reap some benefit from it.
82 Les termes de l'accord sont de nature à assurer la pérennité de l'activité de l'entreprise.
83 L'accord ne porte pas atteinte aux intérêts des créanciers non signataires.
84 Supra note 14, Art. L611-10-3: Saisi par l'une des parties à l'accord constaté, le président, du tribunal, s'il 
constate l'inexécution des engagements résultant de cet accord, prononce la résolution de celui-ci. Dans 
les mêmes conditions, le tribunal prononce la résolution de l'accord homologué.
85 Supra note 14, Art. L611-10-1.
86 Supra note 14, Art. L611-12.
87 Supra note 51.
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5. Individual and Collective Interests in Insolvency Disputes
Insolvency (bankruptcy) cases are collective proceedings88 in which numerous 
persons (the debtor, secured and unsecured creditors, a bankruptcy administrator 
(trustee), co-obligators, etc.) participate. There is therefore a dilemma of how ADR can 
reconcile the interests of all of the creditors. Should each creditor participate in the 
ADR procedure? What effect does the agreement between the debtor and some of the 
creditors have on all of the creditors? Is this compatible with the principle of pari passu?
The unique feature of ADR in insolvency cases is that not all of the creditors usu-
ally participate in the dispute resolution. In contrast to insolvency adjudication, the 
debtor usually resolves the dispute with the principal creditors (who are likely to initiate 
insolvency proceedings), and a formal insolvency case is not initiated. For instance, in 
the United States, ADR is utilized in three contexts for insolvency disputes: to resolve 
disputes and achieve a consensus with respect to plans for reorganization; for single-
creditor disputes; and for multiple-creditor claims of the same nature.89 The debtor can 
negotiate with each creditor individually (like in the Greyhound case), or with a group 
of creditors to come to a collective agreement. This situation is defined as a “cram-
down”. A cramdown is the judicial power to confirm or amend a plan even against the 
wishes of certain creditors.90 Thus, when a debtor comes to an agreement with some cre-
ditors, the other creditors cannot challenge the agreement and have to comply with it.
However, a cramdown is only possible in court-supervised ADR.91 If the court is 
not involved in the ADR (at least in the confirmation of an agreement between the par-
ties), a cramdown is not possible, and thus has no effect over the creditors who did not 
participate in the ADR procedure. In other words, if the peaceful settlement ending the 
dispute is not confirmed by the court, it does not have effect over the creditors who are 
not parties to the agreement.
In France, the application of ADR (ad hoc mandate and conciliation) in pre-in-
solvency disputes is primarily used to resolve a dispute between the debtor (le débiteur) 
and the principal creditors (principaux créanciers).92 However, the Code de commerce 
says nothing about which creditors shall be regarded as “principal”. The author consi-
ders the “principal creditors” to be the creditors who hold the majority of claims against 
the debtor and can initiate insolvency adjudication. The Code de commerce does not 
establish any rules regarding the protection of creditors who do not participate in ADR 
procedures. If the court confirms an amicable agreement, it becomes binding upon the 
creditors who were not involved in the ADR process. In each case (especially in conci-
liation), the court has to establish whether a balance between the interests of the debtor 
and the creditors (and between the creditors themselves) is ensured. 
88 Supra note 39.
89 Supra note 9.
90 Wong, D., R. 2012. Chapter 11 Bankruptcy and Cramdowns: Adopting a Contract Rate Approach 
Northwestern University Law Review. 106(4):1927-1957.
91 Carnal, R. O. 2015. Expedited Corporate Debt Restructuring in the EU ed. Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, 
Expedited Corporate Debt Restructuring R. O. Carnal. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
92 Supra note 14, Art. L611-7.
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If the parties reach an amicable agreement during the pre-insolvency stage, the 
court can either acknowledge it without any further analysis or endorse it. In the latter 
case, a debtor submits the agreement to the court for endorsement (homologué). In this 
case, the court endorses the agreement if three cumulative requirements are met: the 
debtor is not cash-flow insolvent or the conciliation agreement puts an end thereto; the 
agreement effectively ensures that the company will continue business; and the agree-
ment does not unduly (indirectly) affect the rights of non-signatory creditors. 
Chapter 11 also acknowledges the cramdown procedure. A reorganization plan 
can be confirmed by the court even if some creditors do not agree with it. Thus, even if 
ADR fails and non-signatory creditors do not accept the plan, it still becomes binding 
upon all creditors.93 However, Section 1129(a)(7) of Chapter 11 provides for the statutory 
protection of such creditors (the “Best Interests of Creditors” test).94 Under this require-
ment, the court must ensure that each creditor (or interest holder) will receive at least as 
much under the reorganization plan as it would if a Chapter 7 (liquidation) procedure 
had been opened.
In general, ADR and cramdowns are compatible with the main principles of in-
solvency law (pari passu, fair distribution of debtor’s assets). However, the court plays a 
crucial role. When an agreement between a debtor and creditor(s) is reached in France 
or the United States, the court has to review and assess the lawfulness of the agreement 
in terms of the main principles of insolvency law. The situation is different when the 
court is not involved in the ADR procedure (usually in the form of workouts). In this 
case, any agreement between the debtor and one or more creditors does not impact non-
signatory parties. 
6. Application of Contract Law in Insolvency Disputes
The major goal of ADR in insolvency disputes is the conclusion of a peaceful settle-
ment which satisfies the creditors’ interests and allows the debtor to continue business. 
Since this agreement (peaceful settlement, reorganization plan) is the coordination of 
the will of the parties (a contract), it is primarily governed by contract law. However, 
due to the specifics of insolvency disputes, there are questions as to what extent even 
the major principles of contract law, such as freedom of contract, should be applicable.
Under Chapter 11, bankruptcy courts have to confirm the debtor’s reorganization 
plan. This article examines how the principle of freedom of contract is applicable in 
insolvency disputes under the United States insolvency regime.
A Reorganization Plan in the US Insolvency System
The underlying idea of the bankruptcy process in the United States is that debtor 
reorganization takes precedence over liquidation. Therefore, an agreement between the 
93 Supra note 42, Art. 1129(b).
94 Supra note 42, Art. 1129(a)(7)(ii): With respect to each impaired class of claims or interests each holder 
of a claim or interest of such class will receive or retain under the plan on account of such claim or interest 
property of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, that is not less than the amount that such holder 
would so receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated under chapter 7 of this title on such date. 
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parties should be aimed at continuation of the debtor’s business. However Chapter 11 
establishes some mandatory requirements for reorganization plans.95 Since these plans 
are often agreed upon between the debtor and a number of creditors, it is important to 
ensure fairness and equality (to a reasonable extent) for all of them. Some authors be-
lieve that the aim of Chapter 11 is to “strike a balance between the need of a corporate 
debtor in financial hardship to be made economically sound and the desire to preserve 
creditors’ and stockholders’ existing legal rights to the greatest extent possible.”96 
Reorganization plans are meant to ensure the “re-start” of business and commer-
cial activities. Although resolution of the dispute primarily depends on the parties, 
the court plays a significant role in this procedure. A reorganization plan must be “ap-
proved by the bankruptcy judge, and creditors desiring to attack the settlement have to 
meet the requirements for having standing to oppose the court order.”97 Furthermore it 
should satisfy the parties’ interests and accrue the debtor’s assets: “the overarching con-
sideration in ruling on a settlement is whether the settlement is ‘fair and equitable’ and 
‘in the best interest of the estate’.”98 Thus, the reorganization plan must ensure a balance 
between satisfaction of the creditors’ claims and continuity of the debtor’s business.
Only a debtor can present a reorganization plan to the court. The debtor must file 
the plan within 90 days of entry of the order for relief. The court may grant an exten-
sion if this is required due to circumstances for which the debtor should not justly be 
held accountable.99 The reorganization plan must be reasonable and concluded in good 
faith.100 If the settlement is disputed by a single creditor, it does not mean that the set-
tlement will be not approved by the court. Which ADR method(s) shall be applicable 
depends on the parties.
Reorganization plans often include various changes to debtor/creditor obligations, 
such as interests rates on outstanding debts, reinstatement of contracts, modification 
of liens, or contract amendments. Furthermore, creditors normally reduce or modify 
the debt, so they can become shareholders of the reorganized company. The parties are 
basically free to agree on the changes to mutual obligations. The principle of freedom of 
contract is therefore applicable. The parties are essentially only restricted by the goals 
of Chapter 11.
Pursuant to case law, ADR in insolvency cases must ensure a fair balance of the in-
terests of the parties. For instance, in the Matter of Sargeant Farms, Inc., the bankruptcy 
court concluded that mediation must ensure equality of the parties.101 Since a reorgani-
95 Supra note 42, Art. 1123.
96 Supra note 9.
97 Hopt, K. J. ed., Mediation: Principles and Regulation in Comparative Perspective, R. Kulms Mediation 
in the USA: Alternative Dispute Resolution between Legalism and Self-Determination, 1245-
1328:1301.
98 In Re Southeast Banking Corp., 314 B.R. 250 (Bankr.  S.D.  Florida  2004). [interactive]. [accessed 18 
September 2017]. < https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1870804/in-re-southeast-banking-corp/>. 
99 Supra note 42, Art. 1221.
100 Supra note 97.
101 If the parties cannot agree to the terms of compensation prior to the mediation, then the Court determines 
a minimum hourly rate and maximum fees, without prejudice to the mediator to seek further fees and 
costs if the mediation process so.
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zation plan must be approved by the court, case law has formed certain criteria which 
the court should assess: (a) the probability of success in the litigation; (b) the difficulties, 
if any, to be encountered in the matter of collection; (c) the complexity of the litigation 
involved, and the expense, inconvenience and delay necessarily attending it; and (d) the 
paramount interest of the creditors and a proper deference to their reasonable views in 
the premises.102 A reorganization plan cannot merely deal with the changes to debtor/
creditor obligations. It must encompass various circumstances which may impact con-
firmation and execution of the reorganization plan. Moreover, additional requirement 
for the good faith and feasibility of the plan have been formed in case law. These non-
statutory requirements restrict application of the principle of freedom of contract. If a 
reorganization plan fails to satisfy these requirements, the bankruptcy court will not to 
confirm it. However, perhaps the major incentive for the parties is to reach an agree-
ment through negotiation and find a common business solution.
The Good Faith Requirement 
The good faith requirement103 is intertwined with the policies and objects of 
Chapter 11: preserving going concerns and maximizing property available to satisfy 
creditors, giving the debtor the opportunity to make a fresh start, discouraging debtor 
misconduct, and achieving fundamental fairness and justice.104 Case law confirms that 
in assessing whether a plan has been filed in good faith, “the important point of inquiry 
is the plan itself and whether such a plan will fairly achieve a result consistent with the 
objectives and purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.”105 
A reorganization plan must aim to accrue debtor’s assets and trigger business. 
This means that the debtor must pursue economic activities and manage assets in the 
most efficient way possible. If a reorganization plan meets all of the established criteria, 
this is a win-win situation for the debtor and the creditor(s).
The Feasibility Requirement
Feasibility is another seminal requirement for a reorganization plan under Chapter 
11.106 The reorganization plan must be realistic and workable,107 meaning that the debtor 
must be able to fulfill the new obligations to the creditors and restore business activities. 
A reorganization plan must be realistic and enforceable, based firstly on the debtor’s 
financial capacities. The court must also consider the ongoing litigation procedures that 
102 Supra note 98.
103 Supra note 42, Article 1221(a)(3). 
104 In Re American Capital Equipment, Llc 688 F.3d 145 United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit: 
Pursuant to the case law, “Specifically, under Chapter 11, the two recognized policies, or objectives, 
are preserving going concerns and maximizing property available to satisfy creditors. [interactive] 
[accessed 18 September 2017]. <https://www.leagle.com/decision/infco20120725086>.
105 Ibid.
106 Peeples, P. 2009.The Use of Mediation in Chapter 11 Cases, ABI LAW Review. 401-426, 402.
107 Supra note 104: “The Bankruptcy and District Courts found that the Fifth Plan was not feasible, and we 
agree. Although § 1129(a)(11) does not require a plan's success to be guaranteed, see In re Applied Safety, 
Inc., 200 B.R. 576, 584 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1996), the plan must nevertheless propose a realistic and workable 
framework”. 
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the debtor is part of: “In considering feasibility, the bankruptcy court must evaluate the 
possible impact of the debtor’s ongoing civil litigation . . . A plan will not be feasible if its 
success hinges on future litigation that is uncertain and speculative, because success in 
such cases is only possible, not reasonably likely.”108 Furthermore, only one reorganiza-
tion plan which addresses specific insolvency problems is permissible: “the plan must be 
reasonably likely to succeed on its own terms without a need for further reorganization 
on the debtor’s part.”109 Therefore, it must be workable in the future. For this reason, the 
court must anticipate how the debtor will participate in the specific market after the 
reorganization.
In general, the principle of freedom of contract is restricted in the conclusion of 
a reorganization plan. Case law implies that the principle of freedom of contracts is 
restricted:
• A fair balance between the debtor’s and creditors’ interests must be estab-
lished. This means that the reorganization plan must establish a balance be-
tween continuation of the debtor’s business and fast and reasonable repay-
ment of the debt;
• The interests of all of the debtor’s creditors must be protected. Although they 
may not have participated in the ADR procedure due to the specifics of insol-
vency disputes, the reorganization plan may not treat the creditors unequally. 
This requirement is based on the premise that even without the consent of all 
of the creditors, the reorganization plan (cramdown) must ensure continuity 
of the debtor’s business and that the debtor will be able to repay debts in the 
future;
• The reorganization plan must be workable and reasonable. This is directly 
linked to a complex assessment of the debtor’s position (the amount of debt, 
assets, the market, business opportunities, and changes in the market). 
In the United States, the ADR system is based on the object and purpose of Chapter 
11. It allows the parties to efficiently conclude a reorganization plan, which is seminal to 
ensure continuity of the debtor’s business activities and to satisfy the financial interests 
of the creditor(s). ADR encourages the parties to negotiate debt repayment and reach an 
agreement. ADR mechanisms make it possible to reach a fast solution that is acceptable 
for both parties and that will be confirmed by the court. Similar to that of the reorgani-
zation plan procedure, the primary goal of a peaceful settlement in French insolvency 
law is continuity of the debtor’s business activities. Although this kind of agreement 
is concluded between the debtor and the principal creditors, it may not impede on the 
rights of non-signatory parties. If the debtor fails to fulfil the agreement, this usually 
means that the debtor cannot handle the financial burden, in which case other insol-
vency law measures must be applied. 
108 Supra note 104.
109 Supra note 104.
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Conclusions
ADR has been recognized as a suitable instrument for solving insolvency disputes. 
The major pro-debtor countries (France, the United States) have introduced successful 
ADR models for insolvency disputes. In both countries, the main purpose of ADR in 
insolvency disputes is to avoid debtor bankruptcy (winding up). The ultimate goal of 
ADR in insolvency cases is the conclusion of a peaceful settlement (a reorganization 
plan) which ends the dispute. Contract law is therefore applicable. However, due to the 
specifics of insolvency disputes, application of the main principles of contract law is 
complicated. There is also the problem of cram down. In the major pro-debtor coun-
tries, peaceful settlement (reorganization plan) is agreed between the debtor and the 
principle creditors, meaning that not all of the creditors necessarily agree with it. Thus, 
it is the bankruptcy court responsible for confirming the peaceful settlement (reorgani-
zation plan) that has to assess its impact on other creditors. Some statutory laws (for 
instance, Chapter 11) establish requirement for reorganization plans, and case law has 
developed some other important criteria. French insolvency legislation is less thorough. 
However, in both countries, the parties’ free will is restricted by the key goal of dispute 
resolution: continuation of the debtor’s business. A peaceful settlement (reorganization 
plan) can only affect the non-signatory parties in the case of a cram down. If a peaceful 
settlement is not confirmed by the court, it has no impact on non-signatory creditors. 
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ALTERNATYVUS GINČŲ SPRENDIMAS NEMOKUMO TEISĖJE
Remigijus Jokubauskas
Mykolo Romerio universitetas, Lietuva
Santrauka. Dažniausiai nemokumo ginčai yra nagrinėjami teisminiu būdu, kuris 
turi ryškių trūkumų: neišsprendžiama „bendro turto” problema, nutraukiamas verslas. 
Todėl kyla klausimas, ar nemokumo ginčai gali būti be bylos nagrinėjimo teisme. Būtent 
alternatyvus ginčų sprendimas (AGN) tapo atsvara teisminiam nemokumo ginčų nagri-
nėjimui. Priešingai nei bylos nagrinėjimas teisme, AGN leidžia išvengti pagrindinių teis-
minio nagrinėjimo trūkumų. Pirma, juo siekiama taikaus ginčo sprendimo, kuris leistų 
susitarti tarp skolininko ir kreditorių, antra, juo siekiama sutaikinti skirtingus esminiu 
interesus nemokumo ginčuose (skolininko verslo tęstinumas ir kreditorių reikalavimų pa-
tenkinimas). Trečia, ginčas nėra nagrinėjamas viešai. Pagrindinės skolininkui palankų 
nemokumo režimą nustačiusios šalys (Jungtinės Amerikos Valstijos ir Prancūzija) pateikė 
AGN procedūras sprendžiant nemokumo ginčus, kurie gali būti vertinami kaip AGN vys-
tomo pagrindas kitose valstybėse.
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